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COMMENTS
Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality
in Copyright Infringement
JANE C. GINSBURG*
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law, as Professor Curtis Brad-
ley demonstrates, is highly suspect, if not illegitimate, unless clearly
authorized by Congress." The apparently "extraterritorial" charac-
ter of much recent copyright litigation has led some U.S. courts to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or on grounds of
forum non conveniens when the cases present offshore points of
attachment.2 As copyright commerce becomes increasingly inter-
* Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law. Copyright 1997 by Jane C. Ginsburg. Thanks for research
assistance to Deirdre von Dornum, Columbia Law School Class of 1997. Portions of this
Comment are adapted from Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of
Forum and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. LJ. 153 (1997).
1. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37
Va. J. Int'l L. 505 (1997).
2. See, e.g., Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381,387
(9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing claim concerning offshore infringement because no
unauthorized act was completed in United States and federal copyright law does not apply
extraterritorially); Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696,704 (9th Cir.
1995) (dismissing case between two foreign parties on basis of fonm non convenlens);
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 1994)
(dismissing case because Copyright Act does not apply to extraterritorial acts of
infringement); Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1427, 1433 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing copyright infringement claim for lack of infringing
act committed in United States); Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co.,
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national, some of these dismissals may be unwarranted. They also
may be incorrect in their refusal to apply U.S. law or retain U.S.
jurisdiction over the parties: the decisions may be too quick to per-
ceive "extra"-territoriality in claims that in fact allege multiter-
ritorial infringements. "Multi"-territorial copyright claims involve
acts or parties located in more than one country, but do not neces-
sarily require application of a single law-the forum's-to resolve
the entire claim. This Comment will attempt to distinguish mul-
titerritorial claims from classic extraterritorial claims.
A claim is not "extraterritorial" simply because it involves for-
eign acts or parties. Extraterritoriality, in the negative sense the
term has acquired, means the application of one country's laws to
events occurring outside that country's borders. Coverage of acts
that commence or take place in part within the borders of the
country whose law is applied, however, is not "extraterritorial" in
this sense. (Were it otherwise, no transnational tort claim could be
adjudicated because the origin and impact of the harm would be in
different countries.) Unauthorized acts of reproduction, public
performance/display, or distribution of copyrighted works may
occur in many countries at once, but a multiterritorial claim may be
justiciable in U.S. courts, even if its resolution in whole or in part
requires application of foreign copyright laws. As Professor Brad-
ley emphasizes, U.S. courts should be more willing to apply foreign
law.3
In this Comment, I identify a variety of copyright problems
which, despite their international character, do not involve "extra-
territorial" assertions of U.S. law. I further inquire when, given a
genuinely "multiterritorial" claim, a U.S. court should retain juris-
diction over the entirety of the claim, and what law(s) it should
apply.
934 F. Supp. 119, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing infringement claim on forum non
conveniens grounds because claims arose under foreign copyright laws); Los Angeles News
Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
that defendant is not liable for damages "arising extraterritorially").
3. Bradley, supra note 1, at 577-78.
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I. ExTRA? TER~rroRIALITY
A. A Sample Scenario
Consider the following recent trademark infringement case.4
Does it pose a problem of extraterritoriality?
An Italian publisher, Tattilo Editrice, purveys Playmen maga-
zine, a publication similar in appearance and content to Playboy
magazine. Indeed, several years ago, Playboy obtained an injunc-
tion against the U.S. distribution of Playmen.5 Playboy was unsuc-
cessful in its suit against Playmen in Italy, although it did obtain
relief against Tattilo in other European countries.6 Recently, Tat-
tilo opened a Playmen website, offering "Playmen Lite" images to
all who accessed Tattilo's homepage (located on its server in Italy),
and "Playmen Pro" images to those who, in addition, faxed a credit
card number to Tattilo in Italy. Playmen online is written in Eng-
lish, and Tattilo's homepage was accessible in the United States.
Playboy initiated a contempt action in the Southern District of
New York, asserting that the online version of Playmen violated
that court's order prohibiting U.S. distribution of the magazine 7
Assume that this had been a copyright infringement case rather
than a trademark infringement case and that it had not arisen as a
contempt proceeding. Would Playboy's claim against Tattilo have
demanded that the court resolve an "extraterritorial" copyright
conflict? If the dissemination of "Playmen Lite" and "Playmen
Pro" had been through "analog" media-the mailing of hard cop-
ies of the images into the United States-there would be no doubt
that infringing acts such as unauthorized distribution were commit-
ted in, or directed toward, the United States. The Copyright Act's
section 602 importation right affords a useful parallel.8 Although
some consider this provision to express Congress' intent to apply
4. The illustration is based on Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter Playboy If1.
5. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
[hereinafter Playboy 1] (granting preliminary injunction); Playboy Enter., Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter Playboy 11]
(granting permanent injunction).
6. See Playboy 1, 486 F. Supp. at 423 (noting that Playboy "succeeded in preventing
dilution of the mark by Playmen everywhere but in Italy, where a standard inconsistent
with our law was applied to deny Playboy any protection") (footnote omitted); see also id.
at 423 nn.11-12 (citing cases from the United Kingdom, France, the former West Germany,
and Italy).
7. Playboy III, 939 F. Supp. at 1033.
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (distribution right).
1997]
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U.S. law beyond our borders, 9 I would, in fact, contend that noth-
ing could be more hyperterritorial than the importation right.
After all, this right proclaims, "I don't care how lawfully made that
copy was wherever you obtained it, nor do I address what happens
to that copy so long as it stays outside the United States; but, once
you bring it here, it's our law that applies."'10 Similarly, in Playboy
III, the claim addressed transmissions of images that were received
in the United States." It did not matter how lawful Playmen might
have been at the point of origin of its creation or dissemination; in
this country, Tattilo's transmission violated Playboy's intellectual
property rights. The defendant publisher may have implicitly con-
ceded the intra-U.S. territorial nature of its activities, as it
attempted to recharacterize its transmissions to fit U.S. law excep-
tions for private importation.' 2 Thus, Tattilo contended that it was
not sending copies of Playmen into the United States; rather, U.S.
consumers were taking a "virtual voyage" to Italy, where they
acquired personal copies of the magazine, then brought them back
home to the United States.' 3 The judge was not persuaded: "[t]hat
the local user 'pulls' these images from Tattilo's computer in Italy
as opposed to Tattio 'sending' them to this country, is irrelevant.
By inviting United States users to download these images, Tattilo is
causing and contributing to their distribution within the United
States.""
Should the court have been more receptive to Tattilo's argument
that the lawfulness of its acts at the Italian point of origin of the
transmission should determine the legitimacy of making Playmen
available to Internet users around the world? This seems a rather
extrusive application of Italian law, insensitive not only to the
impact of the transmission on the economic interests of copyright
holders in the receiving countries, but also to the commission of
violations of the intellectual property systems of the receiving
9. See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096
(9th Cir. 1995).
10. The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to determine the scope of the
§ 602(a) right. In particular, the Court will address whether U.S. copyright law bans all
unauthorized private imports of U.S.-copyrighted works-whatever the country of
manufacture--or whether it is limited to copies manufactured outside the United States.
L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1113-17 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3798 (U.S. June 2, 1997) (No. 96-1470).
11. Playboy III, 939 F. Supp. at 1035.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2) (exempting importation of items for private use and not
for distribution from copyright law).
13. Playboy Iff, 939 F. Supp. at 1039.
14. Id. at 1044.
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countries. In this respect, application of U.S. law to copies distrib-
uted in the United States is even less "extra"-territorial than is the
well-recognized application of the forum's law in the context where
the impact of a tort committed out of state is felt in the forum state.
Compare the classic peripatetic boiler case: Although the conse-
quences of the tort are felt in State B, where the boiler blows up,
the wrongful conduct-the violation of the duty of care-takes
place in State A, where the boiler was manufactured.15 By con-
trast, in a copyright infringement case, there may be no tort at the
place of manufacture (the magazine is lawfully made in Italy), but
the act of distributing copies of it in the United States is an
independent violation of U.S. copyright law.16
Does the Internet context of the Playmen case make application
of U.S. law to U.S. downloads less territorially appropriate? Ironi-
cally, one could contend that distribution over the Internet rein-
forces the territorial claims of the United States (and other
receiving countries). This is because, at least under U.S. and Euro-
pean Union copyright norms, receiving a work in the memory of
one's computer, even the temporary memory of the computer, con-
stitutes the making of a copy. 17 As a result, another independent
15. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 434. 176
N.E.2d 761, 762 (1961) (upholding personal jurisdiction in Illinois and applying Illinois law
where plaintiff injured in Illinois by safety valve manufactured by defendant in Ohio and
incorporated into a hot water heater in Pennsylvania); see also Svendsen v. Questor Corp,
304 N.W.2d 428,431-32 (Iowa 1981) (upholding personal jurisdiction in Iowa and applying
Iowa law where plaintiff was injured in Iowa by the collapse of a pool table manufactured
in Missouri).
16. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 602.
17. Electronic distribution entails the making of "copies" within the meaning of the 1976
Copyright Act, at least as amended in 1980, when Congress adopted the recommendations
of the Commission on New Technological Uses (CONTU). Under the CONTU approach,
a "copy" is made when a computer program (or by extension, any work expressed
digitally) is received into the computer's temporary memory. See Robert A. Gorman &
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties 692-93 (4th ed. 1993) (quoting Final Report
of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works). This
approach is the premise for § 117 of the U.S. Copyright Act, and has been followed in the
European Union. See Council Directive 91/250, art. 4(a), 1991 OJ. (L 122) 44. U.S. courts
have also applied this principle. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,
517-18 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994); Advanced Computer Servs. v.
MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356,362,364 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that unauthorized
loading of a program into computer's temporary memory creates an infringing copy); see
also Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that receipt
of data in unauthorized user's computer creates a copy). Thus, to receive an electronic
distribution is to make a copy, even if no further, more permanent, copy follows. Bruce A.
Lehman, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property
Rights 64-66 (1995).
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act of copyright infringement in addition to distribution (assuming
the copyright owner did not authorize receipt by U.S. users) will
have been committed within the territory of the country where the
downloading occurred. One might object that the downloader is
not the defendant offshore website operator but the local computer
user. Nonetheless, the offshore party is inciting or causing those
copies to be made in the receiving countries, and thus would have
committed contributory copyright infringement in the country of
the download.'
B. Other Recent Cases: Less "There" There than Meets the Eye
The Playmen scenario, whether played out in analog or digital
media, should be seen as a non-problem for the assertion of U.S.
judicial power and the application of U.S. law with respect to trans-
missions or copies received in the United States.' 9 Some other
recent copyright controversies presenting foreign points of attach-
ment should also have been viewed as non-problems, at least for
the exercise of the U.S. court's judicial power (if not necessarily for
the choice of U.S. law), but the courts that decided them had a
different, more problematic, perspective. The cases fall into two
categories: (1) foreign parties; and (2) foreign acts.
1. Non-U.S. Parties
U.S. copyrights can be owned by non-U.S. residents. Not only
may a foreigner acquire a U.S. copyright by transfer from a U.S.
author or copyright owner, but by virtue of international copyright
However, several commentators have questioned or even strongly criticized the
proposition that receipt in a computer's random access memory entails making a 
4copy."1
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 29, 40
(1994) (criticizing); David Post, New Wine, Old Bottles: The Evanescent Copy, Am. Law.,
May 1995, at 103, 103-04 (questioning); Pamela Samuelson, The Nil Intellectual Property
Report, Communications of the ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 22-23 (criticizing). But cf. Ira L.
Brandriss, Writing in Frost on a Window Pane: E-mail and Chatting on RAM and
Copyright Fixation, 43 J. Copyright Soc'y USA 237, 277-78 (1996) (distinguishing
infringing copying-which may be accomplished by transitory perceptible access-from
fixation in creating a work of authorship, which should require a more stable format).
18. One who knowingly induces another or furnishes the means for another to commit
copyright infringement will be liable for contributory copyright infringement. See, e.g.,
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); Gershwin Publ'g
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). For a
fuller discussion of contributory infringement as a basis for applying U.S. law to foreign
actors, see Bradley, supra note 1, at 573-76.
19. In the actual case, the court was able to avoid questions of jurisdiction and choice of
law because the case arose as a contempt proceeding, and the court stressed that it always
has jurisdiction to enforce its orders. See Playboy 111, 939 F. Supp. at 1035-36.
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agreements such as the Berne Convention) to which the United
States is a party, a foreigner from a treaty country who creates a
work of authorship abroad is automatically a U.S. copyright
owner.21 Thus, unauthorized copying in the United States of the
work of a foreign author (covered by an international copyright
agreement) violates that author's U.S. rights. Consequently, the
foreign author should be able to bring suit in U.S. courts to protect
her rights in the United States.
This was not so clear to two of three judges on a Ninth Circuit
panel who were persuaded that a claim by a Singaporean plaintiff
alleging infringement of a computer program in the United States
should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds in part
because of the minimal U.S. interest in a dispute between foreign
litigants over a foreign-made product.2 But neither the nationality
of the parties nor the country where the work is manufactured
should be determinative, particularly when the claim alleges that
the infringement occurred in the United States. Had the plaintiff
sought to join claims addressing unauthorized copying or distribu-
tion in Singapore and other countries, there would have been a
stronger basis for the forum non conveniens dismissal as to those
claims. The claim, as stated, could not have been more territorially
focused on the United States. Indeed, the computer programs at
issue had first been published in the United States, and hence were
works of U.S. origin.23 The nationality or domicile or residence of
the parties should have been a red herring.24
The Ninth Circuit majority insisted that it was not discriminating
against foreign copyright holders because the forum non con-
veniens defense was equally applicable to U.S. copyright plain-
tiffs3 5 The analysis turned not on nationality, contended the
majority, but on the availability of an alternative forum. What
made the High Court of Singapore a preferable alternative forum,
apart from the parties' nationality? The majority manifested a per-
20. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971 (amended 1979), S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 104.
22. Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 1995).
23. Id. at 705 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
24. This is all the more true because the Singaporean action adjudicated only local
claims. See Aztech Sys. Pte v. Creative Tech., Ltd., 1996 SLR LEXIS 124, at *79
(Singapore H.C. June 26, 1996). Thanks to Ted Sabety, Columbia Law School Class of
1997, for research assistance regarding the Singaporean action.
25. See Creative Tech., 61 F.3d at 701.
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haps uncharacteristically nonterritorial conception of the infringe-
ment at issue. Plaintiff's program was copied in Singapore, and the
copies were shipped to the United States for distribution in the
United States. Under a strictly territorial view, one act of infringe-
ment (reproduction) occurred in one territory (Singapore) and
another act (distribution) occurred in another territory (the United
States). The Ninth Circuit majority, however, preferred to empha-
size the "source" of the infringement in Singapore: "[W]e are
unable to conceive of a more effective means of protecting Crea-
tive's United States copyright interests than by shutting off the
pipeline of infringing goods at the source. '26 The majority pointed
out that U.S. courts award worldwide damages when the initial
infringing reproduction can be traced to the United States and
speculated that Singaporean courts could do the same thing.27
Without inquiring into Singaporean law, the majority assumed that
Singapore afforded a forum in which the entire series of infringing
acts, from their initiation in Singapore, to their culmination abroad,
could be adjudicated, either under Singaporean law, or under a
combination of Singaporean and U.S. law.28
In asserting that its forum non conveniens analysis would have
been the same had the plaintiff (and perhaps even the defendant)
been U.S. nationals or residents, the majority appears to be point-
ing towards the forum of the "source" country of the infringement
as the exclusive forum and law through which to adjudicate mul-
titerritorial copyright claims. This is a very interesting idea that
merits serious consideration. This notion, however, is belied by the
Ninth Circuit's other decisions in this area and is in tension with
other Circuits as well. Recall the Playboy case, for example: tak-
ing the Ninth Circuit at its word that the nationality of the plaintiff
is not the key to forum non conveniens dismissal, application of the
"source" country approach would have sent the action to Italy,
26. Id. at 702. Of course, this does not respond to plaintiff's claim for damages for
already-accomplished U.S. distributions, but the majority stated that a forum non
conveniens objection should not be overcome simply because the alternate forum may not
offer equivalent remedies. Id. (citing Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477, 1484 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
27. Id. (citing Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988)).
28. In fact, it is not at all clear that a Singporean court (or any other court of the British
Commonwealth tradition) would award damages for offshore infringements. See Eric
Jooris, Infringement of Foreign Copyright and the Jurisdiction of English Courts, 18 Eur.
Intell. Prop. Rev. 127, 138, 146 (1996).
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where no infringement would have been found.29 Indeed, applica-
tion of the "source" country approach leads to the development of
"copyright havens. ' 30 Thus, the concept, if adopted, would require
sufficient inquiry into the jurisdictional and substantive copyright
norms of the "source" country to satisfy the U.S. court that the full
series of allegedly infringing acts will in fact be fairly adjudicated,
before the U.S. court enters a forum non conveniens dismissal.31
Finally, as we will see, the localization of the "source" of the
infringement(s) may require rethinking.
2. Foreign Acts
a. Acts Initiated in the Forum, but Consummated Abroad
Professor Bradley has reviewed the distinction U.S. courts effect
between copyright infringement claims alleging initial acts of copy-
ing in the United States that permit further acts of copying to be
accomplished abroad and claims alleging the "authorization" or
intellectual planning in the United States of acts of copying that are
physically accomplished abroad. Although U.S. courts have
retained jurisdiction over and applied U.S. copyright law to the for-
mer kind of claim, some courts, notably those in the Ninth Circuit,
are more reluctant to do so in the latter context. This reluctance at
first seems consistent with respect for the territorial nature of copy-
29. Cf. Aztech Systems, 1996 SLR LEXIS 124 at *79. In the Singaporean action, the
court applied Singaporean law exceptions to copyright protection to find no infringement
of plaintiff's program; however, in construing the Singaporean statute, the High Court
looked to fair use and fair dealing cases from the United States and the United Kingdom.
30. The term was employed, if not coined, by the European Commission in its
explanatory memorandum accompanying its Proposal for a Council Directive on the
coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and neighboring rights applicable to
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, COM(91)276 final at 4; it is the copyright
equivalent of tax havens. The proposal itself is reprinted at 1991 OJ. (C 255) 3.
31. Although the Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe possibility of a change in
substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the
forum non conveniens inquiry," Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,247 (1981), the
Piper court further declared:
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should
never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course, if
the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be
given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not
be in the interests of justice.
Id. at 254-55. Thus, under Piper, the prospect of a less generous recovery abroad may not
tip the balance against a forum non conveniens dismissal; however, the prospect of no
recovery abroad, because the substantive standard of conduct is markedly lower than the
U.S. forum's norms, may well counsel against dismissal.
32. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 524-26, especially nn.102-13.
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right law. That is, there is no violation of U.S. copyright law if a
work, including a work of U.S. origin, is copied without authoriza-
tion in another country. There may be a violation of that country's
copyright law, but-under this view-that has nothing to do with
the competence of U.S. copyright law.
However, making legislative competence turn on the situs of the
physical act of copying can be unduly formalistic. Consider the
reaction of a federal district judge in Tennessee to the defendant
U.S. record producer's assertion that it had committed no cogniza-
ble violation of U.S. copyright law when it exceeded the scope of
its license from the copyright holder of the musical composition
and authorized third parties to make and sell recordings in foreign
territories for which the defendant had not acquired the rights:
[P]iracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today,
the raider need not grab the bounty with his own hands;
he need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax to
start the presses in a distant land. [The Ninth Circuit]
ignores this economic reality .... Under [the Ninth Cir-
cuit's] view, a phone call to Nebraska [from the United
States] results in liability; the same phone call to France
results in riches. In a global marketplace, it is literally a
distinction without a difference. 33
The Tennessee federal court may have overstated its proposition,
given that the same act that violates U.S. law might well violate
French copyright law, so riches might not ultimately result there,
either. On the other hand, the defendant could achieve a substan-
tial practical advantage if a U.S. court, persuaded that U.S. law
does not apply and that the laws of the countries where the physi-
cal copying occurred did apply, then dismissed the claim on forum
non conveniens grounds remitting the plaintiff to sue in each of the
countries where copying occurred.34 This could prove prohibitive
for many plaintiffs. The problem could be alleviated if the court
that rejected the U.S. copyright claim (assuming it otherwise has
subject matter jurisdiction) applied the copyright laws of the coun-
tries concerned. 35
33. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
34. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), discussed infra text accompanying notes 43-44.
35. See, e.g., London Film Prods., Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 47, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion of subject matter jurisdiction.
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But perhaps the court would be wrong in the first place to find
no violation of U.S. copyright law simply because no physical copy-
ing took place here. After all, does it really make sense to retain
jurisdiction and apply U.S. law to the full panoply of copying when
a single copy was made here, and all the rest followed on abroad,m
but dismiss the claim when plaintiff alleges that defendant here
devised and initiated a scheme to engage others to copy or dis-
tribute abroad? 37 Perhaps courts should be less materialistic about
identifying infringement, and recognize that intellectual acts of
planning unauthorized acts of copying, public performance, or dis-
tribution also can be localized here in the United States.38
Consider another recent decision from within the Ninth Circuit.
In Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television International,3 9
the plaintiff filmed scenes from the 1992 Los Angeles riots that fol-
lowed the acquittal of the police officers who had beaten Rodney
King. Plaintiff authorized NBC to broadcast these scenes in the
United States. Without plaintiff's permission, NBC also transmit-
ted the film footage to the New York offices of foreign news orga-
nizations. Videotapes were made in New York City from these
transmissions, and the footage from these videotapes was further
transmitted to Europe and Africa. The court held that the trans-
missions from New York to Europe and Africa were not infringing
acts completed within the United States, and thus were not cogni-
zable under U.S. law. On the other hand, the videotapes made in
36. See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d. Cir. 1988);
cf. Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427, 1433
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing copyright infringement claim because plaintiff "failed to allege
an infringement within the United States that led to extraterritorial infringement").
For some courts the award of damages for infringements consummated offshore isjustified because once an unauthorized copy is made in the United States, "[t]he 'work is
thereafter impressed with a constructive trust so that the plaintiff is entitled to profits
accruing from the exploitation of the work anywhere in the world.'" Los Angeles News
Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting 3
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.05, at 14-96 (1996)).
37. See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
1994).
38. Cf. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., N.Y. LJ., Mar. 10,
1983, at 7, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 9, 1983) (retaining jurisdiction to apply N.Y. unfair
competition law to N.Y.-headquartered defendant who allegedly conceived and directed
from New York a scheme to infringe plaintiff's trademark rights in many foreign
countries).
39. 942 F. Supp. at 1265.
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New York did come within the scope of the U.S. Copyright Act,
and statutory damages could be awarded for those two copies.40
Had the court applied the "source" theory of infringement,
plaintiff should have recovered for all acts, domestic or foreign,
stemming from the initial unauthorized U.S. relay of the video to
the foreign news services' New York offices, or at least from the
unauthorized copying of that transmission onto videotapes. But
not only did the court confine the U.S. ambit of the case to the two
acts of copying onto videotape, its analysis indicates that if NBC
had fed the footage to foreign broadcasters directly, rather than
making videotapes first, there would have been no cognizable act
of infringement in the United States.n1 Thus, everything turns on
the creation of a material copy within U.S. borders. This does not
make sense. The economic impact is the same-usurpation of for-
eign markets-whether defendant first makes an unauthorized
reproduction in the United States, then distributes or transmits
abroad, or whether it disseminates the work in dematerialized
form, such as a satellite feed, from the United States to points
outside.
Again ironically, the Internet may come to the aid of those seek-
ing a U.S.-made copy. If the U.S. actor makes copies available to
foreign participants over the Internet, there will have been initial
copying in the United States, when the U.S. originator of the off-
shore dissemination uploads the document to a U.S. server from
which it will transit abroad. That is, to send a document via e-mail,
the sender does not divest herself of "her" copy; she makes a new
copy when she executes the command to attach to the e-mail the
file containing the document. Of course, the e-mailer could just as
easily avoid the United States by ensuring that copies are "sent"
from a server outside the United States. This illustrates the prob-
lem with defining as the "source" of the infringement the place
where physical copies are made. 2 It makes more sense to identify
the place where the plan to engage in unauthorized dissemination
40. Although the videotapes were the source of the transmissions to Europe and Africa,
plaintiff recovered no damages stemming from the initial U.S. copying because the court
held that plaintiff had failed to submit admissible evidence as to damages, either territorial
or "extraterritorial," and because plaintiff's claim for offshore damages arose under foreign
law. See id. at 1274 & n.7.
41. See Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. General Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir.
1995) (no U.S. infringement when diversion of satellite signal commenced in United States,
but programs were received in Canada).
42. See Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 1095, 1111-15 (1996)
(discussing difficulty of discerning physical locations of Internet users).
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was devised, and then to consider the application of that country's
law.
b. Acts Violating No U.S. Copyright
Assuming there are no U.S. copyright interests at stake, but fur-
ther assuming the court has personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion, should the court dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds?
In a recent decision involving worldwide videocassette rights to
Stravinsky's Rite of Spring, recorded on the soundtrack to Disney's
Fantasia, the Southern District of New York dismissed the action,
remitting the plaintiff, a music publisher, to pursue its copyright
infringement claims in each of the eighteen foreign countries where
videocassettes of Fantasia were distributed.43 Because the U.S.
copyright in the work had never been secured, there was no U.S.
copyright claim. There were nonetheless substantial U.S. contacts
to the litigation: defendant was a U.S. corporation and the con-
tract in which Stravinsky granted rights to record the Rite of Spring
onto the film soundtrack was signed in New York and governed by
New York law. The court justified its forum non conveniens dis-
missal on the ground that the substantive copyright issues would
best be tried in the countries whose domestic copyright laws would
be called into play by the litigation."
I believe this is a weak basis for dismissal, especially when the
United States probably was the only forum in which all eighteen
copyright claims could have been adjudicated. Nor would the
copyright issues necessarily have been better resolved in eighteen
different proceedings. The substantive issue in the case was
whether a 1939 contract authorizing recording of the music onto
the film's soundtrack for exhibition of the film in theaters should
be interpreted to authorize reproduction and public distribution of
videocassettes of the film. The Southern District of New York
could have heard proof on the resolution of the old license/new
media issue under the laws of the eighteen countries at issue.
Although other countries may resolve that issue differently, the
issue under foreign law is no more elusive than it is under U.S. law.
I believe this decision presents a very unfortunate precedent for an
"Age of Globalism."
43. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119, 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
44. Id.
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II. ADJUDICATING MULTITERRITORIAL COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
IN U.S. COURTS
In cases like Subafilms, Los Angeles News Service, and Boosey &
Hawkes, copyright owners alleged the commission of unauthorized
acts of reproduction, public performance, or distribution in the
United States and in many other countries. The interests of judi-
cial economy should have favored adjudication of all those claims
in a single forum. Where the United States was the nerve center
for multiterritorial infringements-that is, when the defendant is a
U.S. entity that has commenced or directed the commission of
unauthorized copyright exploitation overseas-as was alleged in or
at least appeared to be the case in all three controversies, it is more
than appropriate for the court to retain jurisdiction over the entire
action, even if it does not apply U.S. law to the entire action.
Moreover, under jurisdictional principles in force abroad, the
United States, as the defendant's home forum, may be the only
forum in which it is possible to consolidate all the infringement
claims.45
What law(s) should apply to a claim alleging infringements com-
mencing in one territory, but culminating in many others? I would
expand on the "root copy" approach to argue that if it is possible to
localize in the United States the point from which the communica-
tion of the infringing work (whether or not in material form)
becomes available to the public (wherever that public be located),
then U.S. courts should apply U.S. law to all unauthorized copies,
wherever communicated. Similarly, where the United States is the
"nerve center" for foreign distributions, the domestic acts of plan-
ning and intellectually implementing the offshore acts should suf-
fice to justify the application of U.S. law to the full series of acts.
Is this recommendation consistent with the conflicts rule of the
Berne Convention, which directs application of the law of the
country "where protection is claimed" to govern infringement
actions? 6 One can read that text to require distributive applica-
45. See, e.g., Case 68/93, Shevill v. Presse Alliance SA, 1995 E.C.R. 415, 465 (holding
that jurisdiction over the entirety of a multiterritorial defamation claim may be had only in
the country of the headquarters of the defendant publisher). For fuller treatment of
judicial competence in the European Union over multiterritorial copyright claims, see Jane
C. Ginsburg and Myriam Gauthier, The Celestial Jukebox and Earthbound Courts:
Judicial Competence in the European Union and in the United States over Copyright
Infringements in Cyberspace, 173 Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur [R.I.D.A.] 61
(July 1997).
46. Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 5(2).
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tion of the laws of all of the countries in which infringing copies
appear.47 Or one could contend that the "country where protec-
tion is claimed" is the forum country when that is the country from
which the infringement originated, and which is best placed to
accord an effective international remedy.48
Where the defendant's contacts with the forum do not justify
extensive application of U.S. law, and where the acts complained of
lack a U.S. nexus, or (as in Boosey & Hawkes) there no longer is
any U.S. copyright claim, the court should revert to traditional ter-
ritorial approaches and apply the law of each country where the
acts were committed. Copyright is a "transitory cause of action":
so long as the court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction, it
can, and in appropriate cases should, apply foreign copyright law. 4 9
But if the claim presents no question of federal copyright law,
would a U.S. federal court have subject matter jurisdiction? So
long as there is complete diversity of the parties, for example, a
U.S. defendant and a foreign plaintiff,50 the federal court will be
competent to adjudicate. But what if there is incomplete diversity?
In the absence of a federal claim, the case would have to be
brought in a state court. However, because U.S. copyright is exclu-
sively federal subject matter jurisdiction,51 state courts may not be
well-versed in copyright law, and thus may be particularly tempted
to dismiss a claim presenting issues of foreign copyright law.
On the other hand, when a multiterritorial infringement action is
initiated, there may be good faith allegations of U.S. as well as for-
eign infringements. Consider the Subafilms case. Plaintiff claimed
that defendant had authorized the distribution of videocassettes
both in the United States and abroad, in violation of the scope of
the license. U.S. law certainly governed the U.S. distributions,
47. See Pierre-Yves Gautier, Du droit applicable dans le "village plan6taire," au titre de
l'usage immatdriel des oeuvres, 1996 Recueil Dalloz Sirey (Chroniques) 131, 133.
48. Cf. Paul Edward Geller, Conflict of Laws in Cyberspace: Rethinking International
Copyright in a Digitally Networked world, 20 Colum.-VLA J.L & Arts 571, 597 (1996)
(making a similar argument, in the context of infringements for which a point of origin
cannot easily be identified); Michel Vivant, Cybermonde: Droit et droits des rdseaux, 1996
La Semaine Juridique [J.C.P.] I, No. 3969, at 401, 403 (noting competence of the law most
likely to afford the "most appropriate means to erase the ill effects of the harmful
activity").
49. See London Film Prods., Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F. Supp.
47,49-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 11 Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law & Practice § 162
(2d ed. 1996).
50. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 47; Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt
Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
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even if it did not cover the foreign distributions. Suppose that in
the course of the action, the claim that the U.S. distributions
infringed the licensor's U.S. copyright failed. The U.S.-issued
"authorization" to distribute abroad would not (in the Ninth Cir-
cuit's view) state a claim under U.S. copyright law; as a result, the
federal court would be left with only the foreign copyright law
claims. Suppose also that there was incomplete diversity between
the parties. The federal court nonetheless has (and should exer-
cise) discretion to retain the claim, even though the federal claim
has dropped out.5 2 Judicial economy favors retaining an action
with which the court has already gained some acquaintance, and
which presents many of the same facts that would be adduced in
actions abroad. More important, the United States still remains
the forum with the most points of attachment to the litigation, and
retaining the action is particularly desirable given the alternatives:
remitting the action to a state court that may be ill-prepared to
adjudicate it; or dismissing in favor of splintering the action among
the courts of the several (or many more than several) countries
where some portion of the infringing acts occurred.
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) (stating that federal court has "supplemental
jurisdiction" to hear state law claims related to the federal claim; if the federal claim fails,
the court "may," but is not obliged to, dismiss the pendent state claims); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (retaining jurisdiction over state labor law claims
after failure of NLRA claim).
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